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Introduction
Inflation has been volatile in the past three years.  Annual
inflation, as measured by the consumer prices index (CPI), rose
to 5.2% in September 2008, fell back sharply over the
following twelve months to 1.1% and then rose again to 3.7%
in April 2010.  That volatility in part reflected the temporary
effects from a number of factors, including movements in food
and energy prices and the temporary reduction in the standard
rate of VAT (between 1 December 2008 and 1 January 2010).
But prices have also been affected by two more fundamental
economic forces:  sterling’s depreciation since mid-2007 is
likely to have pushed up inflation while the financial crisis and
the associated deterioration in demand have acted in the
opposite direction.(2)
The Bank of England’s monetary policy objective is to maintain
price stability.  Stable prices are defined by the Government’s
inflation target, which is currently 2% as measured by the
annual change in the CPI.  Subject to that, the Bank is also
tasked with supporting the Government’s economic objectives,
including those for growth and employment.  The Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) seeks to achieve those objectives by
setting the level of Bank Rate and, since March 2009, by
purchasing assets financed through the issuance of central
bank reserves, a programme sometimes referred to as
quantitative easing.(3)
The Bank’s success in meeting its monetary policy objectives
depends in part on the credibility of the monetary policy
framework itself:  if people expect inflation to return to target
in the medium term then they may behave in such a way that
deviations of inflation from target are more short-lived.  There
are various channels through which inflation expectations can
influence inflation.  If households expect high inflation in the
future, for example, they are likely to demand higher nominal
wages and push up on companies’ costs.  And if companies
expect to bear higher production costs, then they will raise
their own prices for the goods and services they produce.  The
prices that households and businesses expect in the future will
also affect their spending and investment decisions today.
Inflation expectations cannot be directly observed.  But
surveys of households, businesses and economists, together
with measures derived from the prices of financial market
instruments, can act as a guide.  Since 1999, the Bank has
commissioned a survey of households’ attitudes to inflation
and interest rates, conducted on its behalf by GfK NOP.  The
survey was extended in May 2009 to include questions relating
to the MPC’s policy of asset purchases, or ‘quantitative easing’.
The box on page 116 describes the Bank/GfK NOP survey in
more detail.
This article examines whether the increase in the volatility of
inflation in the past three years has affected households’
attitudes to inflation and to monetary policy more generally.
The first section examines how households’ perceptions of
inflation have changed relative to measured inflation in that
period.  The following section considers how households’
expectations for inflation, both in the near term and in the
longer term, have behaved.  The final section examines how
public attitudes to monetary policy more broadly have evolved
in recent years.  
Inflation has been volatile in the past three years.  This article examines how that has affected
households’ attitudes to inflation and to monetary policy more generally.  Some of the volatility in
inflation has fed through to households’ perceptions of inflation, as measured by the Bank/GfK NOP
survey.  But inflation expectations have responded less than changes in perceptions:  households
may have placed weight on the weak economic environment and the inflation target rather than
simply extrapolating past trends in prices.  Public satisfaction with the Bank, which deteriorated
between 2007 and 2009, has improved in recent quarters.
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Perceptions of inflation 
CPI inflation has been more volatile since 2007 compared with
the previous ten years.  Much of that volatility reflected 
short-term movements in food and energy prices (Chart 1)
and the temporary reduction in the standard rate of VAT.  But
prices have also been affected by two more fundamental
economic forces:  the depreciation of sterling since mid-2007
is likely to have pushed up both import and consumer prices
while the financial crisis and the associated deterioration in
demand have acted in the opposite direction.  In the past three
years, inflation has deviated from target more than in the first
ten years of the MPC’s existence (Table A).
The increased volatility of inflation has, in part, been reflected
in movements in households’ perceptions of inflation 
(Chart 2).  Perceptions rose in tandem with official estimates
of inflation between late 2007 and early 2009.  But they were
slower to respond to the subsequent fall.  This section
considers what factors might influence households’
perceptions of inflation.
The Bank/GfK NOP survey
Since 1999, the Bank has commissioned GfK NOP to survey
the general public’s attitudes to inflation and monetary policy.
These surveys are conducted in February, May, August and
November of each year.  They cover around 2,000 individuals,
with an additional 2,000 interviewed in an extended survey
each February.
Rather than focusing on a specific measure of inflation, such as
the consumer prices index or the retail prices index, the survey
is phrased in terms of the prices of goods and services in
general.  Respondents are asked how they perceive prices to
have changed over the past twelve months and how they
expect them to change over the year ahead.  Additional
questions asking individuals about their expectations for
inflation in two and in five years’ time were introduced in
February 2009.  
In addition to the questions on prices, individuals are also
asked a range of questions to assess how well they understand
the Bank’s monetary policy framework and the tools by which
the inflation target can be achieved.  In March 2009, the
Monetary Policy Committee announced that, in addition to
setting Bank Rate, in order to meet the inflation target it
would start to inject money directly into the economy — a
policy that has come to be known as ‘quantitative easing’.
Since May 2009, the survey has included additional questions
designed to assess the public’s awareness of quantitative
easing and their beliefs about how this policy would help to
ensure that inflation remains close to the target in the medium
term.
As with all surveys, the Bank/GfK NOP survey is subject to
sampling error.  The sample is designed and weighted to ensure
that it is representative of known population data on age,
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Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Food prices include non-alcoholic beverages.  Energy comprises utilities (electricity, gas and
other fuels) and fuels and lubricants.
Chart 1 Contributions to annual CPI inflation from food













Perceptions of current inﬂation
Sources:  Bank/GfK NOP survey and ONS.
(a) The inflation target was changed on 10 December 2003 to 2% as measured by the CPI from
2.5% as measured by the RPIX.
Table A Volatility in annual inflation
Percentage points
Standard deviations Mean deviations from target(a)
1997– 2004–07 2008– 1997– 2004–07 2008–
2003 present 2003 present
CPI 0.4 0.5 1.0 n.a. 0.0 1.0
RPIX 0.4 0.6 1.4 -0.1 n.a. n.a.
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) The inflation target was changed on 10 December 2003 to 2% as measured by the CPI from 2.5% as
measured by the RPIX.Research and analysis Public attitudes to inflation and monetary policy 117
Three oft-cited influences on households’ inflation perceptions
are food and energy prices and media coverage of the
economy.(1) Around 80% of respondents to the February 2010
Bank/GfK NOP survey cited at least one of household energy,
transport and petrol, and food and drink as being ‘very
important’ when forming their perceptions of inflation.  And
over half cited media reports about inflation as being either
‘very important’ or ‘fairly important’ when forming their
perceptions (Table B).
Individuals’ perceptions of inflation may be sensitive to
movements in food and energy prices because it is relatively
easy for them to assess how the prices of these items have
changed.  People tend to buy a broadly comparable basket of
food from week to week, and have similar energy requirements
each year.  The prices of food and energy items also tend to be
highly visible:  the price of fuel, for example, can be observed
easily at petrol stations and supermarkets.
Similarly, media reports provide a ready source of information
on inflation that can be obtained without requiring much time
or effort.  More frequent mentions of inflation in the media
may lead to an increase in the number of people who take
notice of inflation.  And it may cause people to update their
views on inflation on a more regular basis (Carroll (2003)).
The rise in inflation perceptions in 2008 is consistent with the
increase in food and energy price inflation and with the pickup
in media coverage that occurred at that time.  Annual food
price inflation rose from 3% in August 2007 to 13% in August
2008 (Chart 3) — its highest rate in the period since 1997.
Energy price inflation rose from around zero in August 2007 to
30% in September 2008, again its highest rate in the period
since the Bank was granted operational independence for
monetary policy.  The 2007/08 rise in inflation also received
greater coverage in the media than did previous rises in
inflation (Chart 4).  But food and energy price inflation fell
back sharply in early 2009, as did media coverage of inflation.
So it is less clear that these factors can explain why
perceptions were slow to respond to the subsequent fall in
inflation.
In summary, the recent rise in the volatility of inflation appears
to have been partially reflected in households’ perceptions of
inflation.  Rising food and energy prices, along with greater
media coverage, can help to explain why perceptions rose in
tandem with measured inflation in early 2008.  Those factors
may also have contributed to the more recent rise in
perceptions in 2010.





















Perceptions of current inﬂation 
  (right-hand scale)
Media headlines of rising prices(a) 
  (left-hand scale)
Number of headlines per month Per cent
Sources:  Bank/GfK NOP survey and © 2007 Factiva, Inc.  All rights reserved.
(a) Six-month moving average.  Based on searches designed to count the number of headlines
referring to increases in inflation, wages, and food and energy prices but, where possible,
excluding headlines referring to non-UK inflation and house prices.  Newspapers included in
the search are the Daily Express, the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror, the Daily Star, The Daily
Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Independent on Sunday, The Mail on Sunday,
the News of the World, The Observer, The People, The Sun, the Sunday Mirror, The Sunday
Telegraph, The Sunday Times and The Times.
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Sources:  Bank/GfK NOP survey and ONS.
(a) Food prices include non-alcoholic beverages.  Energy comprises utilities (electricity, gas and
other fuels) and fuels and lubricants.
Chart 3 Inflation perceptions and food and energy price
inflation(a)
(1) For further discussion of how food/energy prices and media coverage influence
inflation perceptions, see Barnett et al (2009) and Benford and Driver (2008).
Table B Percentages of respondents citing influences on inflation
perceptions as either ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important(a)
Very important Fairly important Total(b)
Household energy 62 25 87
Transport and petrol 59 24 82
Food and drink 54 34 88
Cost of housing(c) 31 23 53
Clothing and footwear 29 36 65
Media reports about inflation 21 38 59
Media reports about VAT 18 39 58
Other 10 24 34
Source:  Bank/GfK NOP survey.
(a) Respondents could select more than one option.  This question is asked only in the extended February
survey.
(b) Components may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) For example, mortgage payments and rent.118 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
Inflation expectations
Households’ expectations for inflation in the year ahead have
diverged from their perceptions of current inflation for much
of the past three years (Chart 5).  Prior to 2008, there tended
to be a close relationship in the Bank/GfK NOP survey
between the median household’s inflation perception and the
median near-term inflation expectation.  But expectations rose
by less than perceptions following the increase in inflation
between August 2007 and September 2008 and fell more
quickly than perceptions in the final months of 2008 and early
2009.(1)
More recently, in the May 2010 Bank/GfK NOP survey,
households’ expectations for inflation in the near term picked
up sharply, rising back towards their perceptions of current
inflation.  Expectations for inflation in the next two years 
also rose, albeit to a lesser extent (Chart 6).  In contrast, 
longer-term expectations were little changed.
Indeed, households’ expectations for inflation in the longer
term have generally been more stable than their near-term
expectations during the recent period of inflation volatility.
Since February 2009 (when questions on longer-term
expectations were first asked in the Bank/GfK NOP survey),
the five year ahead measure has picked up by less than the one
year ahead measure.  That relative stability of longer-term
inflation expectations is also a feature of the YouGov/Citigroup
survey.  Having fallen back in 2008, expectations for inflation
five to ten years ahead have drifted up a little since then.  But
they have been much less volatile than the corresponding one
year ahead measure.
This section considers what factors might have driven
households’ near-term inflation expectations during the past
two years.  It then examines changes in longer-term
expectations, exploring what factors might have accounted for
their stability relative to shorter-term measures.
Near-term inflation expectations
Households’ perceptions of inflation are likely to be an
important influence on their expectations for inflation in the
year ahead.  For example, some individuals may use a simple
rule of thumb to forecast inflation, expecting inflation over the
next year to be similar to that over the past year.  Around eight
in every ten respondents to the Bank/GfK NOP survey in
February 2010 cited past changes in prices as being either 
‘very important’ or ‘fairly important’ when forming their 
near-term inflation expectations, as in previous years.  In past
Bank/GfK NOP surveys, around half of the respondents
reported that they expected inflation in the coming year to
remain unchanged from its current perceived rate.  That
proportion fell back significantly in the second half of 2008
and has been around one third since then (Chart 7).
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Source:  Bank/GfK NOP survey.
(a) Ignores those who answer ‘don’t know’ to either question.
Chart 7 Households whose expectation for inflation in
the year ahead equals their perception of current
inflation
Chart 5 Median inflation perception and expectation for
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Source:  Bank/GfK NOP survey.
(1) The box on page 37 of the May 2010 Inflation Report compares expectations in the
Bank/GfK NOP survey with other available measures.Research and analysis Public attitudes to inflation and monetary policy 119
The increased volatility of inflation has also been accompanied
by an increase in the dispersion of near-term expectations
across individuals (Chart 8).  For example, a greater proportion
of respondents to the February 2010 Bank/GfK NOP survey
thought that prices over the year ahead would either be
unchanged or fall than did in mid-2006, when the median
inflation expectation was at a similar level.
The following subsections consider two factors that could help
to explain the pattern of expectations in the past two years.
First, the financial crisis, and the associated decrease in
demand, may have led some people to lower their near-term
inflation expectations relative to their perceptions of inflation.
Second, observation of past episodes of high inflation, after
which inflation has typically reverted to target, may have led
some individuals to place more weight on the 2% inflation
target when forming their expectations.
Developments in demand
The fall in demand for UK goods and services over the past two
years is likely to have put downward pressure on prices and
thus on some individuals’ near-term inflation expectations.
Real final domestic demand was around 5% lower in 2009 Q2
than it was in 2008 Q2.  Almost 80% of respondents to the
February 2010 Bank/GfK NOP survey said that the state of the
British economy was either a ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important factor
in forming their near-term inflation expectations.  Consistent
with that, the proportion of respondents who expected
inflation in the next year to be no more than 1% rose in 2008,
at the same time that GDP growth fell sharply (Chart 9).
For some people the effect of falling demand on their inflation
expectations may have been balanced by the elevated level of
inflation.  Of those respondents who said that the state of the
economy had an important bearing on their near-term
inflation expectations, around 90% also said that their
perception of current inflation was a very or a fairly important
influence.  In recent quarters, the level of real final domestic
demand has recovered somewhat while perceptions of
inflation have remained high.  Some of the rise in near-term
inflation expectations since February 2009 could therefore
reflect a waning influence from demand.
The role of the inflation target 
Some households may use the inflation target as a guide to
near-term inflation.  Indeed, over half of the respondents to
the Bank/GfK NOP survey in February 2010 reported that the
inflation target was an important factor in forming their
expectations for inflation in the year ahead.  The proportion of
respondents who expected inflation in the year ahead to be
within 1 percentage point of the target has gradually risen to
around one quarter in May 2010 from around one sixth in
August 2008.  
The greater weight being placed on the inflation target may
reflect households learning from past observation that
deviations of inflation from target tend to be short-lived.
There have been three episodes in the history of the MPC in
which inflation rose more than 1 percentage point above 
the target, starting in:  March 2007, May 2008 and 
January 2010.  In the first two instances, the deviation of
inflation from target proved to be temporary and inflation
subsequently fell below 2%.  The MPC also expects inflation to
return to target from its currently elevated level, as set out in
the May 2010 Inflation Report.  The experience of the previous
episodes could have caused households to now place more
weight on the inflation target when forming their expectations
for near-term inflation.
Households with a greater awareness of the monetary policy
framework appear to be more likely to have a view about the
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Source:  Bank/GfK NOP survey.
Chart 8 Distribution of households’ inflation
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Sources:  Bank/GfK NOP survey and ONS.
(a) Chained-volume measure at market prices.
Chart 9 Percentage of households who expected
inflation in the year ahead to be no more than 1% and
real GDP120 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
survey, households who had heard of quantitative easing were
less likely to answer ‘don’t know’ when asked what they
expected inflation would be in the year ahead than those who
had not (Chart 10).  But, aside from that difference, the
distribution of inflation was broadly similar across the two
groups.
The two hypotheses discussed here have different implications
for monetary policy.  The MPC’s remit recognises that inflation
will, on occasion, depart from the 2% target as a result of
shocks and disturbances.  The MPC would be concerned,
however, if temporary increases in inflation led to a persistent
increase in households’ inflation expectations because that
could make it harder to return inflation to target.  If the
stability of inflation expectations relative to perceptions
reflected the fall in demand offsetting elevated perceptions,
then there is a risk that near-term inflation expectations might
increase if demand continued to recover.  That could be
consistent with the rise in near-term inflation expectations in
the most recent Bank/GfK NOP survey.  In contrast, if people
placed more weight on the MPC’s ability to return inflation to
target, then near-term inflation expectations might be less
responsive to economic news.
Longer-term inflation expectations
As noted above, households’ longer-term inflation
expectations appear to have been less volatile than their 
near-term counterparts, despite falling in early 2008 
(Chart 6).  This section explores what factors might explain the
relative stability of longer-term inflation expectations and
what might have driven their fall in 2008, which occurred
against a background of rising inflation.
The relative stability of longer-term inflation expectations
could reflect a well-functioning inflation-targeting regime.  If
households believe that movements in inflation away from
target will be transitory then an increase in the volatility of
inflation should not feed through into their expectations for
inflation in the longer term. 
But other factors appear necessary to explain the fall in 
longer-term inflation expectations in 2008.  For example, the
deterioration in the economic environment may have led
some households to revise down their longer-term inflation
expectations (Chart 11).  Perhaps reflecting that, the
percentage of households who reported that they expected
prices to fall or remain unchanged on average over the next
five to ten years reached a record high in late 2008 (Chart 12).
The fall in longer-term inflation expectations also coincided
with a near fourfold increase in the number of media headlines
on deflation, suggesting that media coverage may have
influenced expectations about inflation in the longer term as
well as in the short term.
Overall, measures of households’ longer-term inflation
expectations appear to be well-anchored.  But a more
prolonged period of above-target inflation could increase the
risk that inflation expectations rise.  The MPC continues to
monitor data on longer-term inflation expectations closely.
Attitudes to monetary policy and satisfaction
with the Bank
The public’s attitude to monetary policy may have been
affected by the recent volatility of inflation, together with
wider changes in the UK economy such as the financial crisis
and associated recession.  This section discusses how both
public awareness of and satisfaction with monetary policy
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(a) Rolling three-month averages.
(b) Chained-volume measure at market prices.
Chart 11 Households’ expectations for inflation over the
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Source:  Bank/GfK NOP survey.
Chart 10 The distribution of one year ahead inflation
expectations for those who have and have not heard of
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individuals’ perceptions of past changes in interest rates and
their expectations for future developments.
Awareness of the monetary policy framework
Households’ awareness of the monetary policy framework
appears to have been little affected by recent economic
events.  The proportion of respondents to the Bank/GfK NOP
survey who knew, without guidance, that ‘Britain’s basic
interest rate level’ is set by either the Bank or the MPC has
remained around 40% since the survey began in 1999.  And
when options were offered, around 70% of respondents
identified the Bank of England as the group responsible for
setting interest rates.  Broadly the same proportion of
respondents to the May 2010 survey — one half — had heard
about quantitative easing as had when the question was first
asked in May 2009.  Those who had heard of quantitative
easing were more likely to know who sets monetary policy
than those who had not.
Satisfaction with the Bank
On balance, the public have been satisfied with the
performance of the Bank in the past three years (Chart 13).
But the degree of satisfaction deteriorated between 2005 and
2009, before improving more recently.
Some of the deterioration in satisfaction since late 2005 is
likely to have reflected concerns about the severity of the
financial crisis and the depth of the recession (Chart 13).
Consistent with that, satisfaction has been more resilient
among individuals who are more aware of the actions that the
Bank has taken in response to those events.  Having cut Bank
Rate sharply, from 5.75% in late 2007 to 0.5% in March 2009,
the MPC injected £200 billion of money into the economy by
purchasing assets financed through the issuance of central
bank reserves (a programme sometimes referred to as
quantitative easing).  In the May 2010 Bank/GfK NOP survey,
the net proportion of respondents who were satisfied with the
Bank was around 50% among those who had heard of
quantitative easing but only about 15% among those who had
not (Chart 14).
Monetary policy
Households have, on balance, perceived a fall in interest rates
on deposits, mortgages and bank loans in the past two years
(Chart 15).  But those perceived changes in interest rates
appear smaller than the fall in average interest rates on the
stocks of outstanding savings and debt, which in turn have

















Percentage of respondents Per cent
Annual GDP growth(a) 
  (left-hand scale) 
Net satisfaction with the Bank(b)
  (right-hand scale) 
+
–
Sources:  Bank/GfK NOP survey and ONS.
(a) Chained-volume measure at market prices.
(b) Net satisfied is the percentage of respondents who were fairly or very satisfied with the Bank
less the percentage who were fairly or very dissatisfied. 


















Source:  Bank/GfK NOP survey.
(a) Of those who answered the question in May 2010, 45% had heard of quantitative easing and
55% had not.
(b) Net balance satisfied is the percentage of respondents who were fairly or very satisfied with
the Bank less the percentage who were fairly or very dissatisfied.
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Sources:  YouGov/Citigroup survey and © 2007 Factiva, Inc.  All rights reserved.
(a) Rolling three-month averages.
(b) Six-month moving average.  Based on searches designed to count the number of headlines
referring to deflation and decreases in inflation, wages, and food and energy prices but, where
possible, excluding headlines referring to non-UK deflation and house prices.  Newspapers
included in the search are as in Chart 4.
Chart 12 Households’ expectations for inflation over the
next five to ten years and media discussion of falling
prices122 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
conditions have driven a wedge between movements in 
Bank Rate and in retail rates.  Changes in credit conditions may
also explain why households do not appear to have recognised
the full extent of the measured reduction in interest rates.  For
example, an individual looking to borrow money may choose
not to take out a loan because the interest rate is too high.  In
that instance, his perception of interest rates might rise but
there would be no effect on the average interest rate on the
stock of loans outstanding.
Households’ expectations for future monetary policy have
varied considerably in recent years.  On balance, households
have only once expected interest rates to fall, in November
2008 (Chart 16).  That survey followed the co-ordinated
action taken by central banks around the globe on 
8 October 2008, which included the MPC cutting Bank Rate 
by 50 basis points on that day, and the MPC’s decision to cut
Bank Rate by a further 150 basis points on 6 November.  The
size of those cuts may have led people to expect further
significant reductions in interest rates and thus pushed the net
balance below zero.  But fewer individuals may have expected
interest rates to fall further as the MPC continued to reduce
Bank Rate and the scope for additional reductions became
correspondingly smaller.
Conclusion
This article has examined whether the increased volatility of
inflation in the past three years has affected households’
attitudes to inflation and to monetary policy more generally.
Over that period, households’ perceptions of inflation, as
measured by the Bank/GfK NOP survey, appear to have
reflected some of that volatility.  But their near-term inflation
expectations have responded less to changes in perceptions.
And their expectations for inflation in the longer term by less
still.
Households’ perceptions of inflation rose in tandem with
official estimates of inflation between late 2007 and 
early 2009.  But perceptions were slower to respond to the
subsequent fall in inflation.
Households’ expectations for inflation in the year ahead have
diverged from their perceptions of current inflation for much
of the past three years.  It is likely that some individuals
lowered their near-term inflation expectations in response to
the financial crisis and the associated decrease in demand.  But
observation of past episodes of high inflation, after which
inflation has typically reverted to target, may also have led
people to place more weight on the 2% inflation target when
forming their expectations.
More recently, households’ near-term inflation expectations
have risen back towards perceptions of current inflation.  
But their expectations for inflation in the longer term 
remain little changed, likely reflecting the credibility of the
inflation-targeting regime.  A more prolonged period of 
above-target inflation could, however, increase the risk that
inflation expectations rise.
Public awareness of the UK monetary policy framework does
not appear to have been affected by recent economic events.
But it is likely that concerns about the severity of the financial
crisis and the depth of the recession weighed on the public’s
satisfaction with the Bank.  Over the past year, however, public


















Source:  Bank/GfK NOP survey.
(a) Percentage of respondents who thought that interest rates would rise less the percentage
who thought that rates would fall.
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Sources:  Bank of England and Bank/GfK NOP survey.
(a) Perceived interest rates are the percentage of respondents who thought that interest rates
had risen over the past year less the percentage who thought that rates had fallen.  Data are
quarterly observations.
(b) Effective deposit rate is the three-month average of household time and sight deposit
effective stock rates weighted by the outstanding balances.
(c) Effective loan rate is the three-month average of household secured and unsecured
borrowing effective stock rates weighted by the outstanding balances.
(d) Bank Rate is the three-month average.
Chart 15 Interest rate perceptions and effective
household interest ratesResearch and analysis Public attitudes to inflation and monetary policy 123
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